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9.22.2004

9/11 commission: Chapter 3.1

Chapter three details what our intelligence structure looked like. It gives an interesting background as to the leadership structure and culture within the FBI and CIA.
Chapter 3.1 covers the "new threat" of terrorism, citing the first attack in 1993 as a turning point in terror threats against the United States. It details how every single one of the terrorists responsible for the 1993 bombing were caught and prosecuted. Noting that only one of them was able to leave the country, but was caught two years later. Eventhough this seems like a good thing to most readers, the report has a somewhat partisan tone to it here. Noting that we took a "law enforcement" approach to terrorism and making that sound like a bad thing. I thought that was the whole point after all, to capture the terrorists and bring them to justice? And is this method preventive, you may ask? Well, there is mention of an FBI informant who learned of bomb plots in New York that summer on major landmarks. The FBI used this information, swooped in and arrested the whole lot and there were no attacks that summer.
Another alarming thing is that the report seems to criticize the government for not alerting the public that things will get worse and we're not equipped to handle them. Why would the government ever do that? What would it accomplish other than creating fear and possible pandemonium? How much good has come from the ridiculous national security colour chart? By telling the American public, somewhere, sometime, someone might be trying to kill you, but we have no more information.
An unfortunate consequence of this superb investigative and prosecutorial effort was that it created an impression that the law enforcement system was well-equipped to cope with terrorism. Neither President Clinton, his principal advisers, the congress, nor the news media felt prompted, until later to press the question of whether the procedures that put the Blind Sheikh and Ramzi Yousef behind bars would really protect Americans against the new virus of which these individuals were just the first symptoms.
-9/11 Commission Report pg 72


It seems a little convenient now to say that these apprehended terrorists were just the first symptoms of a new virus, did we know that in 1993? Also, it fully discounts the legal system as a means to justice for terrorists because it says "The law enforcement process is concerned with proving the guilt of persons apprehended and charged." As if we should consider everyone guilty before proven innocent, that's just not the country we live in.

9.15.2004

more from chapter 2

Most important passage of chapter 2 of the 9/11 Commission report:

"Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Ben Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Queda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States." (emphasis added)
--The 9/11 Commission Report, pg 66


Someone ought to tell Cheney.

9.14.2004

9/11 Commission Chapter 2

Chapter two is mainly a detailed history of Osama Bin Laden and his formation of Al Queda. Although this history is thorough, it seems to leave some holes about what America was doing at the time. It seems that Al Queda was receiving some weapons and training from Iran, about the same time of the Iran Contra scandal - but there's no mention of that in the report.
Also of note, Saddam Hussein's government did not help Al Queda and refused to cooperate with them.

not quite finished with this chapter (I know, I'm slow right now, but there's all this campaign work to do:) I'll add more later this week...

9.01.2004

More of 9/11 Commission Chapter 1

The unfortunate National Guard c-130H that watched the plane fly into the pentagon resumed it's course to Minnesota and had the misfortune of watching Flight 93 crash as well. Another interesting thing about flight 93 is just how long the passenger revolt continued through repeated attempts from the terrorists to quell them by rolling the plane and tossing the passengers around, they kept fighting to the bitter end. I couldn't even imagine.

What was our President doing during this crisis? As those of you who have seen Fahrenheit 9/11 surely know, he sat in the school classroom for at least 7 minutes before doing anything. Whether you would criticize that or not, his next bit of action is questionable as well. He decided he would address the nation and had his entire staff in Florida working on his speech, instead of anything else - he was focused on a speech. Cheney told him not to come back to Washington. It seems from the report that Cheney was running the show (surprise anyone?). While he and his wife were in the White House bunker with his chief of staff and the secret service, it seems that no one can recall him specifically discussing with the President orders to shoot down any aircraft that would not respond to the military planes (such orders are supposed to originate from the President). Although, Cheney gave these orders, which no one would disagree with his action, but it does illuminate the power structure of the white house.

However you view the President and Vice-President's actions, Rumsfeld's ought to make you a bit concerned. The Secretary of Defense was briefed about the terrorist attacks in New York that morning and then the Pentagon was hit. While most people's first instinct might be to go out and help with the rescue efforts, the Secretary of Defense should probably have got in touch with military command or the President, but Rumsfeld ran out to help. The chain of command for the orders to shoot down aircraft apparently goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the military. However, no one could find Rumsfeld, not the President, not the VP, because he was outside aiding with the rescue effort all morning. Not that we would condemn him for helping out, but shouldn't a little light have gone off somewhere in his head telling him he might just be needed at the White House?