9/11 Commission Report Chapter 3.2

This chapter explains the history and operational procedures and environment of the many branches under the Justice Department. The Justice Department encompasses the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigations), the US Marshals Service, the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency), and INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service).

The chapter details the many stumbling blocks within the FBI that hindered it from possibly preventing more terrorist activities. The first of which was the overall structure and environment within the FBI itself. It is broken down into many field offices that operated more or less independently of one another and the management at these offices could elect how funds were distributed. So although the counterterrorism budget tripled during the mid 90s, the amount actually spent on counterterrorism remained the same. Also, the sentiment within the FBI was that counterterrorism would not get you promoted, "Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence work, often involving lengthy intelligence investigations that might never have positive or quantifiable results, was not career-enhancing." (9/11 Commission Report p.74)

There were some attempts to change the culture of the FBI. In 1993, Pres. Clinton appointed Louis Freeh as the Director of the Bureau. He "urged agents not to wait for terrorist acts to occur before taking action." (p. 76) He created a Counterterrorism Division within the FBI to complement the Counterterrorist Center at the CIA and increased the number of legal attaché offices abroad, especially in the Middle East. "In his first budget request to Congress...he stated that 'merely solving this type of crime is not enough; it is equally important that the FBI thwart terrorism before such acts can be perpetrated." (p.76) However, this shift within the FBI never came to fruition, as the leadership of the FBI, the congress and the Office of Budget and Management were unwilling to shift resources away from other priorities to counterterrorism.

There were other problems within the FBI that hindered its response to counter terrorism. Prior to 9/11 the FBI had never completed an assessment of the overall threat to the US. Their information systems were so bad that the Commission report sums it up as, "The FBI lacked the ability to know what it knew." (p.77) The interpretations of the laws governing information sharing between justice department prosecutors and the FBI were constantly misunderstood and exaggerated, leading to ridiculous levels of secrecy at the FBI. Not only did one hand not know what the other one was doing; members of the same teams or divisions often didn't know what the other members were doing.

The lack of adequate information technology was also a factor at the INS. Some of the specific issues mentioned include border patrol agents still using manual typewriters and inspectors at ports still using paper watch lists. There was also a lack of human resources at the INS, especially along the Canadian –US border.

All in all, although there had been many attempts to restructure the FBI and other agencies to focus more on the emerging terror threat, they lacked the capital and cooperation to successfully implement the changes.

posted by Sarai @ 1:08 PM